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Education and the Age Profile of
Literacy into Adulthood
Elizabeth Cascio, Damon Clark, and Nora Gordon

A

merican teenagers perform considerably worse on international assessments of achievement than do teenagers in other high-income countries.
This observation has been a source of great concern since the first international tests were administered in the 1960s (for example, Dillon, 2007), not least
because of the correlation found between these test scores and economic growth
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007).
But does this skill gap persist into adulthood? In this paper, we examine this
question using the first international assessment of adult literacy, conducted in the
1990s. We find that, consistent with other assessments of the school-age population,
U.S. teenagers perform relatively poorly, ranking behind teenagers in the twelve
other rich countries surveyed (in descending order of achievement): Sweden,
Finland, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, the
United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, and Italy. By their late twenties, however,
Americans compare much more favorably to their counterparts abroad: U.S. adults
aged 26 –30 assessed at the same time using the same test ranked seventh in this
group of countries, and the gap with countries still ahead was much diminished.
After establishing these findings, we explore the role of higher education in
this test-score improvement. We find that countries for which the age profile of test
performance is relatively steep, such as the United States, have relatively high rates
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of university graduation. In turn, the educational systems of countries with high
university graduation rates appear to share two features: comprehensive secondary
schools—in which all students have the option of taking courses to prepare for
university—and a highly accessible university sector.
For most of the twentieth century, the United States led the developed world
in participation and completion of higher education. The United States was the
first country to adopt mass education, both at the higher and secondary levels
(Goldin, 2001). In recent years, however, other high-income countries—many of
which established comprehensive secondary schooling in decades prior— have
substantially expanded access to university education. In fact, many countries that
significantly lagged the United States in university graduation only a decade ago—
Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom among others— now have comparable
if not higher graduation rates. Our estimates suggest that these changes will have
striking consequences for the distribution of skill across countries in the years to
come.

Comparing Academic Performance across Countries
Press coverage of differences in academic performance across countries is
typically based on two surveys: the Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study (TIMSS, sponsored by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement) and the OECD Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA). Both of these surveys focus on students who are
teenagers or younger. The TIMSS tested students in fourth and eighth grades in
1995, 1999, 2003, and 2007 (2007 data are not yet available) in mathematics and
science. It includes about 50 countries and is planned to continue on a four-year
testing cycle. The PISA tested 15 year-olds in reading, math, and science in 2000,
2003, and 2006, and is planned to continue on a three-year cycle.1 In addition to
individual student performance on the relevant assessments, these surveys also
collect data on student demographics and school characteristics.
Our focus here is on changes in skill between the teenage years and adulthood.
Two large-scale assessments have been conducted to permit an analysis along these
lines, measuring the information-processing skills of populations aged 16 – 65 in
different countries. The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) was organized
by Statistics Canada and the Educational Testing Service and administered in
conjunction with national household surveys in 1994, 1996, and 1998. The Adult
Literacy and Life Skills Survey (ALL) included different countries in different years,
with testing taking place in 2003 and 2005 (OECD, 2005). In both surveys, responThe data and a description of the TIMSS are available at 具http://timss.bc.edu/#典. See Baker (1997) for
a discussion of weaknesses of the TIMSS. The data and a description of the PISA are available at
具http://www.pisa.oecd.org典.
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dents were administered the same test, regardless of age. We can thus compare how
skill changes from age 16 —where the TIMSS and the PISA leave off—into adulthood. Because the IALS covered 17 OECD countries and the ALL covered only five
(plus one Mexican state), we use the IALS for the analysis here.
The design of international assessments for the school-aged population is
controversial; designing an international assessment for adults is even more
fraught. What curricular content should be covered? Should adults be expected to
remember high school mainstays like trigonometry? (Would researchers and policymakers care if they did?) The approach taken in the IALS is to measure practical
skills in three domains— quantitative literacy, prose literacy, and document literacy—rather than mastery of academic content. Quantitative literacy is defined as
the application of “arithmetic operations, either alone or sequentially, to numbers
embedded in printed materials.” Prose literacy is defined as the understanding and
ability to use “information from texts.” Document literacy is defined as the ability
to “locate and use information in various formats” (OECD and Statistics Canada,
1995). In each domain, proficiency is categorized from level one (the ability to
locate information in text) to level five (the ability to locate information in dense
text with multiple distractors and to make high-level inferences). The median
performer in each country scores at either level two or level three.
To measure their proficiency, IALS respondents were given several passages of
text and, following each passage, were asked a series of questions, with the proficiency level of each question based on the proportion of respondents that answered
it correctly (OECD and Statistics Canada, 1995). A respondent’s overall proficiency
level in a particular domain was then calculated based on the number of questions
at each level that she answered correctly in that domain; Brown and Micklewright
(2004) provide an excellent discussion of this procedure. For our purposes, it is
important to note that the hardest questions were sufficiently difficult that higher
education could affect performance. For example, one level-four quantitative item
gave respondents a table describing compound interest on a given amount of
principal over various time horizons (rows) and for various annual interest rates
(columns) and asked for the minimum annual interest rate required to double the
principal within a five-year horizon.
International data sets like these can be extremely useful in learning about
education production functions at all ages. When studying primary or secondary
education within a country, variation in measured educational inputs typically is
related to unmeasured parental resources and decisions; for example, smaller class
sizes may be more common in communities where parents also emphasize education in many other ways. As a result, it is difficult to estimate the true effect of
smaller classes on student achievement. Correlations between inputs and achievement across countries may suffer less from such biases, because otherwise similar
children in different countries may attend very different schools. Researchers have
combined this empirical approach with data from the TIMMS or the PISA to
investigate the test score effects of organizational structures and elementary and
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secondary education spending (for example, Woessmann, 2003; Fuchs and Woessmann, 2007; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2006). In a similar spirit, we use the IALS
to investigate how the organization and funding of secondary and higher education
influence university graduation and—through university graduation—the skills of
adults.

How Do Countries Differ in the Age Profile of Literacy?
We begin by using the International Adult Literacy Survey to compare the
literacy of two age groups—16 –17 year-olds and 26 –30 year-olds—across countries.
The younger group includes those close to or at the end of compulsory schooling,
which in the countries under investigation (listed below) typically is age 15 or 16
(for international compulsory schooling ages, see Murtin and Viarengo, 2007; for
U.S. compulsory schooling ages, see Oreopolous, forthcoming). The older group
includes those at or close to the end of the period of formal education and training.
Although reports of the current enrollment status of the IALS respondents appear
inaccurate, data on expected graduation ages suggest that most individuals will
have finished their first university degree (for example, a bachelor’s degree) by age
25. We do not explore the evolution of literacy from age 18 through 25 because of
sampling limitations in the IALS; most notably, the sample excludes U.S. college
students residing in dormitories.
As noted, the International Adult Literacy Survey provides distinct measures of
prose, document, and quantitative literacy. Because correlations in performance
across the three domains are strong, we define literacy as an average across the
three domains. Other studies that use the IALS have averaged test scores in the
same way (for example, Blau and Kahn, 2005; Devroye and Freeman, 2001; Hanushek and Zhang, 2006), and the relationships we describe remain substantively
unchanged when using literacy defined in any one domain. We are particularly
interested in the role of higher education in the age profile of literacy and expect
university graduation— our measure of higher education—to have the greatest
effect on performance at the top of the score distribution. Our analysis therefore
focuses on an indicator that is set to one if an individual’s average score across
domains is at or above the test-score threshold for achieving level-four proficiency
(illustrated above in terms of the compound interest question).2
2
This expectation is borne out by the data. As anticipated, we find a strong relationship between
university graduation rates and the difference in the fraction achieving level-four proficiency across the
two age groups (16 –17 and 26 –30). We find a weaker relationship between university graduation rates
and the difference in average test scores across the two age groups and no relationship between
university graduation rates and the difference in the fraction achieving level-one proficiency across the
two age groups. However, it is important to note that data constraints force us to use “on-time” university
graduation rates as a measure of the prevalence of higher education in a country. The effects of
alternative measures, such as the fraction of a cohort that attends a university with or without receiving
a degree, may be apparent elsewhere in the test score distribution.
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Figure 1
Performance on the IALS Test by Age and Country
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Source: International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). The IALS was conducted in 1994, 1996, and 1998
in conjuction with national household surveys.
Notes: Figure plots shares of the population for whom average performance across the three IALS
test domains exceeds the test-score threshold for level-four proficiency. See text for more details.

We restrict our attention to the subset of International Adult Literacy Survey
participant countries that had GDP per capita exceeding $20,000 in 2002, as these
countries could in principle offer the same types of postcompulsory schooling
opportunities. Other OECD countries that participated in the IALS but are excluded from the analysis because of this income threshold are the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland, which in 2002 had GDP per capita of $16,585, $14,365, and
$11,194, respectively. We also exclude Canada, because the public-use data for
Canada do not disclose the age and nativity of respondents. We limit our sample to
the native born to focus on respondents likely to have been schooled in their
current country of residence. It also ensures that our estimates are not influenced
by differing compositions of immigrant populations across countries, for example
in terms of skill (Mayda, 2006) or age.
Figure 1 shows shares reaching level-four or -five proficiency on the International Adult Literacy Survey by country and age group. Countries are ordered from
highest to lowest on the basis of the performance of the younger age group,
represented with the darker bars. Only 4.7 percent of native-born U.S. 16 –17
year-olds achieved level-four or -five proficiency—fewer than any other comparison
country. This finding is consistent with the poor performance of the United States
relative to similar-income countries on other assessments of the school-aged
population.
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We next compare how countries rank by performance of 26 –30 year-olds
(represented by the lighter bars of Figure 1) relative to 16 –17 year-olds. The lighter
bars still show a general downward trend, consistent with the ordering for 16 –17
year-olds, but the rank ordering of countries is different. Quite noticeably, the
United States, with 23 percent of 26 –30 year-olds achieving at least level-four
proficiency, moves from the bottom to the middle of the distribution.
Three patterns stand out in Figure 1. First, in nearly all countries sampled, the
group aged 26 –30 performs better than the group aged 16 –17. Second, there is
considerable variation across these countries in the difference in test performance
between the younger and older groups. In some countries—Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Italy—performance is broadly the same; in others—Sweden, Belgium,
Germany, Norway, and the United States—the difference is striking. Third, the
difference in performance between the older and younger groups is greater in the
United States than in any other country in the sample, except for Norway. For the
remainder of the paper, we refer to the performance differential between the older
and younger groups in a country as the country’s “age profile of literacy.”
Before we consider these facts in more depth, it is important to note that the
International Adult Literacy Survey data are cross-sectional. Because younger and
older test takers were born at different times, the age profiles of literacy that we
estimate reflect both life-cycle changes in literacy—including any gains from higher
education, as well as potential cognitive gains or losses due to aging—and differences in literacy across age groups due to cohort-specific differences in learning
environments. In this symposium, Deming and Dynarski document one source of
different learning experiences across cohorts in the United States: age of entry into
first grade. Cohorts in which a relatively high fraction of students are “redshirted”
(that is, are above age six in first grade) will on average have been exposed to fewer
years of formal schooling at any given age. As a result, they may perform worse on
age-specific tests. Following this logic, if the younger U.S. IALS cohort started
school later than the older U.S. IALS cohort, then at age 16 or 17 we might expect
the younger cohort to perform worse. The performance difference between the
older and younger cohorts measured in the mid 1990s would then overstate the
life-cycle gain in literacy, since it would reflect this life-cycle gain as well as the
literacy advantage enjoyed by the older cohort at age 17.
Because “redshirting” differences between the cohorts under study are small,
they are unlikely to have a large impact on the age profile of literacy in the United
States estimated here. In particular, while 2.5 percent of American six-year-olds
were enrolled in kindergarten as opposed to grade one in 1974 (the cohort of
26 year-olds in the 1994 IALS), this grew to only 5.6 percent in 1984 (the cohort of
16 year-olds in the 1994 IALS). Consistent with this claim, and consistent with the
absence of other cohort-specific shocks to the learning experience in the United
States, the cross-cohort difference in age 17 performance as measured by the
National Assessments of Educational Performance (NAEP) appears small. Cer-
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tainly, performance was not lower in the mid 1990s than it was in the early 1980s
(Krueger, 1998), which suggests we are not overestimating life-cycle literacy gains.
Of course, cross-sectional age profiles of literacy may reflect more than purely
life-cycle gains for a myriad of reasons, and these apply to the other countries in the
analysis as well as to the United States. Nevertheless, several pieces of evidence
suggest that the differences in test performance across age groups documented in
Figure 1 are rooted in life-cycle changes rather than in cohort effects. First,
Hanushek and Zhang (2006) show that within-country associations between schooling and literacy are essentially the same for 26 –35 year-olds and 36 – 45 year-olds in
the IALS, suggesting that the two cohorts attended schools with comparable levels
of productivity. While they do not include data on 16 –17 year-olds, as we do, it is
notable that they only identify significantly different literacy “returns” to schooling
for cohorts (and countries) immediately affected by World War II. Second, we
reestimated country-specific age profiles of literacy while holding constant maternal education, a commonly used proxy for the home learning environment. This
made only a small quantitative difference and no qualitative difference to the age
profiles implied by Figure 1 and shown in subsequent figures.3 This finding also
suggests that most of the cross-sectional differences in test scores across age groups
are driven by life-cycle differences rather than cohort effects.
Finally, because several countries—Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and the United
States— have data in both the IALS and the ALL, we were able to examine the age
profile of literacy within cohorts. For example, in the United States, the withincohort difference in literacy between 16 –25 year-olds in the 1994 IALS and 25–34
year-olds in the 2003 ALL closely matches the across-cohort difference in literacy
between 16 –25 and 25–34 year-olds in the 1994 IALS.4 This finding once again
suggests that cohort effects are small for the United States. In Norway and the
Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland, both surveyed in the 1998 IALS and the

3

Specifically, we estimated the following regression model:
testscore ic ⫽ ␣ c ⫹ ␤ c ages26_30 i ⫹ x⬘i ⌫ c ⫹  ic .

The variable testscoreic represents an indicator for whether individual i from country c achieved at least
level-four proficiency, ages26_30i is an indicator variable set to one if i is between the ages of 26 and 30,
xi is a vector of indicators for maternal education, and ic is the regression error, which captures all other
determinants of individual test performance. Following convention, we impute maternal education with
age-by-country–specific means where missing and include in the vector x indicators set to one for each
variable if imputed. The coefficient ␤c gives the expected difference in test scores between 16 –17 and
26 –30 year-olds in country c, holding constant maternal education. In doing this, we allow the
relationship between test scores and maternal education to differ across countries, because some school
systems may do a better job of compensating for disadvantage than others (Schuetz, Ursprung, and
Woessmann, 2005).
4
Age is reported in 10-year intervals in the ALL for the United States, precluding us from following only
the 16 –17 year-olds in the 1994 IALS over time.
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2003 ALL, the within- and across-cohort differences in test performance between
16 –17 and 21–22 year-olds are also quite similar. For Italy (surveyed in the same
years) and the French and German-speaking regions of Switzerland (surveyed in
1994 and 2003), there is greater divergence between the within- and across-cohort
differences in literacy. However, the divergence is not systematically positive or
negative. This suggests that our use of cross-sectional data adds noise but not bias
to our estimates of the true age profile of literacy.

Education and the Age Profile of Literacy
To understand how education shapes the age profile of literacy, individuallevel longitudinal data would be ideal: we could see how individuals’ scores change
from their teen years through their twenties, and how this evolution depends
on whether the individual participates in higher education. However, our crosssectional data do not permit us to follow specific individuals over time. Hence, we
do not know whether the 16 and 17 year-olds in our sample will go to higher
education, or whether sampled 26 year-olds who attended or graduated from
college enjoyed larger literacy gains through the late teens and early twenties than
sampled 26 year-olds who did not attend or graduate from college. Thus, we
structure our analysis to consider how country-level differences in literacy rates over
this part of the life cycle are associated with country-level differences in average
educational attainment across age groups.
Among the high-income countries in our sample, there is a great deal of
heterogeneity in the age profile of literacy from the teenage years into adulthood,
as already shown. Perhaps surprisingly, these country-specific age profiles are not
strongly correlated with differences between the older and younger age groups in
the conventional measure of educational attainment—years of schooling. We show
this in Figure 2, which plots the difference in the fraction of 16 –17 and 26 –30
year-olds performing at level-four or -five proficiency (from Figure 1) against the
difference in years of education between the older and younger age groups for
each country in the sample. The least squares line fit to the data is upward sloping,
but quite flat, suggesting at best a weak effect of time spent in school after age 16
on skill levels.
However, Figure 2 does not take into consideration the diversity of postcompulsory programs in which individuals might participate and which, potentially,
have very different effects on skill acquisition. For example, in countries where the
gain in years of schooling after age 16 is relatively large, much of the marginal
education may be unproductive. In other countries, the average person might
spend less time in school after age 16, but this time might be spent in types of
education that have larger effects on skill acquisition.
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Figure 2
Differences in Test Scores and Years of Schooling, 16 –17 vs. 26 –30 Year-Olds

Difference in population share with
at least level-4 proficiency

.3

.2

Norway
USA
Germany
Sweden
Belgium

.1

UK
New Zealand

Denmark
Finland

Ireland
Italy

0

Netherlands

Switzerland

-.1
0

1

2
3
4
Difference in years of schooling

5

Source: International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS).
Notes: The variable on the vertical axis is the difference between 26 –30 year-olds and 16 –17 year-olds
in the estimated population share achieving at least level-four proficiency on the IALS test. The
variable on the horizontal axis is the difference in estimated average years of completed schooling
between the two age groups. The least squares fitted line has a slope of 0.0048 (standard error ⫽
0.0106) and an R-squared of 0.0068. See text for more details.

To get a sense of this possibility, Table 1 reports graduation rates from various
postcompulsory programs and the years of full-time enrollment required to complete these programs. Because this type of information is not available in the
International Adult Literacy Survey, we use data from OECD Education at a Glance
from years chosen to correspond as closely as possible to the cohorts observed in
the IALS. The graduation rate is the ratio of program graduates to population at
the expected age of graduation, as reported by OECD (multiplied by 100). The
expected duration of a program is the expected number of years to degree if
enrolled (based on midpoints of the ranges of expected graduation ages for each
level of study). In the first four columns of Table 1, we report on four types of
programs: general upper secondary (high school) programs, vocational or apprenticeship upper secondary programs, nonuniversity tertiary (community college)
programs, and university first degree (bachelor’s degree) programs. In the final
column, we combine these numbers to estimate the average total years of schooling
acquired between ages 16 –17 and 26 –30. This total is equal to the sum, over all
programs, of the product of the probability of having graduated from the program
and its expected duration. This measure thus excludes years of schooling that do
not lead to degrees and so underestimates years of schooling in the total population. However, using a similar approach (multiplying expected duration of a
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Table 1
Graduation Rates and Expected Duration of Studies after Age 16 for
OECD Countries
Graduation rate
[Expected duration of studies after age 16]
Upper secondary (1991)

United States
Other English-speaking
Ireland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Continental European
Belgium
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Switzerland
Scandinavian
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden

Tertiary (1995)

General

Vocational or
apprenticeship

Nonuniversity
tertiary

1st university
degree

Expected years of
education after age 16

73.9b
[2]

NAc
NAc

22
[2]

32
[4]

3.2

69.9
[2]
35.5
[2]
58.5
[2]

8.4
[2]
27.6a
[2]
15.9
[2]

14
[2]
17
[3]
17
[2]

20
[4]
21
[3.4]
31
[3]

2.7

34.9a
[2]
24.2
[3]
18.2
[3]
29.2
[3]
17.2
[4]

41.2a
[2]
93.1
[3]
32.6
[3]
53.0
[3]
70.4
[4]

28
[4]
12
[2]
7
[2]
NAc
NAc
23
[6]

16d
[5]
16
[7]
12
[4]
19
[4]
9
[6]

32.0
[4]
46.8
[3]
39.6
[3]
19.8
[3]

68.4
[4]
78.1
[3]
49.7
[3]
60.4
[3]

8
[4]
22
[2.5]
48
[1.5]
9
[2]

21
[6]
21
[5.5]
22
[4.2]
16
[3.8]

2.5
2.8

3.4
4.9
2.1
3.2
5.4

5.6
5.5
4.3
3.2

Sources: OECD Education at a Glance (1993, 1995, 1997, 1998).
Notes: Graduation rates are ratios of public and private graduates to population at the expected age of
graduation, multiplied by 100. Expected duration of studies is calculated using midpoints of theoretical
graduation age ranges by level of study. Expected years of education after age 16 are obtained first by
calculating theoretical duration ⴱ (graduation rate/100) at each level of study, then summing across the
levels. “NA” means “not applicable.”
a
Data for 1992.
b
Overall upper secondary graduation rate.
c
Program does not exist.
d
Data for 1996.
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program by its graduation rate), we are able to arrive at the most consistent
estimate of program-specific years of schooling available to us for the entire group
of countries. As one would hope, this sum is highly correlated with the difference
in years of completed education between the older and younger age groups in the
International Adult Literacy Survey shown in Figure 2.
Table 1 shows that, in the mid 1990s, great variation existed across countries in
how time was allocated across educational programs after age 16. For example,
average years of postcompulsory education were the same in the United States, the
Netherlands, and Sweden (3.2 years). In the United States, the additional years
were weighted toward tertiary education, particularly at the university first-degree
level. In the Netherlands and Sweden, by contrast, the additional years were
weighted toward upper secondary education, especially vocational programs. The
U.S. advantage in years of university education was attributable to the high fraction
of the U.S. population that graduated from colleges and universities. The U.S.
population also had more expected years of university education (university graduation rate times expected duration of study) and higher university graduation
rates than countries such as Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland,
and Norway, all of which had more expected years of education after age 16.
Of the educational programs described in Table 1, only university education is
correlated with the age profile of level-four or -five proficiency on the IALS
assessment, and this correlation is very strong. Figure 3, Panel A shows this correlation, plotting the difference in high-proficiency performance between the
younger and older age groups against expected years at university (now calculated
as the fraction with a university first degree in the IALS times expected duration of
study, from OECD). The regression line implies that on average, an additional year
of university education increases the share of a cohort reaching at least level-four
proficiency as adults by roughly 14 percentage points. This effect is a large one,
given that in most countries in our sample, between 20 and 40 percent of the older
age group is proficient at level four (as shown in Figure 1). A one-year increase in
average years of university education is, however, an enormous change, representing an increase in university graduation rates of 25 percentage points (assuming an
expected duration of four years). Such an increase would more than double
expected years of university education in most of the countries listed in Table 1. As
shown in Panel B, cross-country variation in university graduation rates appears to
explain much of the cross-country variation in the age profile of high-proficiency
test performance; by comparison (graph not shown), very little of this variation is
explained by the duration of university degree programs reported in Table 1.
How should we interpret the correlations shown in Figure 3? If the points
plotted on this graph represented individuals in a given country, we would be very
concerned about omitted variables and selection. After all, teenagers who choose to
obtain university degrees would likely have different literacy gains between ages
16 –17 and 26 –30 whether they received a university degree or not. As a result, it
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Figure 3
Differences in Test Scores and University Education, 16 –17 versus 26 –30 YearOlds

Difference in population share with
at least level-4 proficieny
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Source: International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). See also Table 1.
Notes: The variable on the vertical axis is the difference between 26 –30 year-olds and 16 –17 year-olds
in the estimated population share achieving at least level-four proficiency on the IALS test. In Panel
(A), the variable on the horizontal axis is the product of the difference between the two age groups
in the university first degree graduation rate (from the IALS) and the theoretical time to degree
(from Table 1). The least squares fitted line has a slope of 0.137 (standard error ⫽ 0.056) and an
R-squared of 0.315. In Panel (B), the variable on the horizontal axis is the university first-degree
graduation rate in the IALS. The least squares fitted line has a slope of 0.721 (standard error ⫽
0.304) and an R-squared of 0.378. See text for more details.

Education and the Age Profile of Literacy into Adulthood

59

would be difficult to infer from simple correlations how the skills of the typical
adult would evolve if policies were introduced to encourage teenagers to attend and
complete college.
A version of this concern also applies when looking across countries: Are
countries with higher university graduation rates those that would otherwise have
larger gains in literacy from the teenage years into adulthood? For example, low
skill levels among teens may be associated with high marginal returns to subsequent
investments in human capital, whether through formal schooling or life experience. If teens in relatively low-skill countries (as measured by test scores at the end
of compulsory schooling) disproportionately obtain unversity degrees in an attempt to compensate for these relatively low skills, we would see a correlation
between the age profile of literacy and university graduation rates at the country
level even if university education did little to build skill. The data in Figure 1 rule
out a spurious correlation driven by this type of mechanism since they suggest that
the average literacy of a country’s 16 –17 year-olds does not predict the literacy
differential between its 16 –17 and 26 –30 year-olds.5 Said differently, countries
often considered to have relatively low-performing secondary schools, such as the
United States, are not systematically converging with other countries.
Of course, these arguments do not rule out all possible sources of spurious
correlation, hence some doubt remains as to whether policy-induced changes in
university graduation would have effects of the magnitude documented in Figure 3.
It is important to understand whether the correlation shown above between university
education and the age profile of literacy should be interpreted as causal. Our estimates
are based on data from the 1990s, and since then, university graduation rates have risen
dramatically in a number of countries. As seen in Table 2, the striking advantage the
United States sustained over high-income countries in university graduation rates has
largely been eliminated.6 By 2004, nearly all of the countries considered in this table

5
When we regress the age profile of literacy on the university graduation rate or expected time spent
in university studies and control for average performance of 16 –17 year-olds, we obtain very similar
slopes to those shown in Figure 3.
6
Graduation rates reported in Table 2 for 1970 through 1995 are approximated by taking the ratio of
university first degree (1970s International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) level 6)
graduates to the estimated country population aged 22 in that year. The number of graduates is from
UNESCO at 具http://www.uis.unesco.org/pagesen/DBGTerIsced.asp典. The 22 year-old population in a
country is estimated with births in that country 22 years prior, taken from the Berkeley Mortality
Database at 具http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/⬃bmd/典. This is the source of discrepancy between the
university graduation rates reported for 1995 in Table 1 and Table 2. The number of graduates needed
to construct this ratio is not available for 2000 and 2004. Graduation rates in these years are gross
completion rates of ISCED (1997 version) level 5a, first degree education at 具http://stats.uis.unesco.
org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId⫽136&IF_Language⫽eng&BR_Topic⫽0典. In 2000
and 2004, U.S. graduation rates are approximated by taking the ratio of bachelor’s degree recipients to
the population of 22 year-olds, estimated as described above. The number of bachelor’s degree
recipients is reported in table 258 of the 2007 National Center for Education Statistics’s Digest of
Education Statistics at 具http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d07/tables/dt07_258.asp典.
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Table 2
University Graduation Rates across Countries: 1970 –2004

United States
Other English-speaking
Australia
Ireland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Continental European
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Switzerland
Scandinavian
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Other OECD
Iceland
Japan

1970

1980

1990

1995

2000

2004

0.24

0.22

0.30

0.37

0.37

0.39

0.16

0.16

0.24

0.39

m

m

m

m

0.08
0.07

0.10
0.13

0.15
0.19

0.24
0.36

0.50
0.29
0.42
0.39

0.48
0.39
0.50
0.39

0.04

0.05

0.16

0.21

m

m

m

m

m

0.06
0.11
0.07
0.14
0.11
0.07

0.08
0.15
0.08
0.18
0.08
0.19
0.18
0.08

0.12

m

0.23
0.24
0.11
0.31
0.24
0.11

0.38
0.33
0.23
0.34
0.33
0.23

0.46
0.36
0.24
0.65
0.36
0.24

0.19
0.17
0.27
0.14

0.31
0.26
0.25
0.17

0.34
0.44
0.40
0.33

0.65
0.53
0.49
0.48

m

m

m

0.20

0.24
0.24

0.34
0.34

0.53
0.37

m

0.04
0.04
m

0.04
0.04
0.07
0.02
0.14
0.04
0.09

0.14
0.13
m

0.15

Sources: From 1970 to 1995, data on university graduates come from UNESCO. University graduates are
defined as those earning a qualification at International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)
(1970s version) level 6 or above. For 2000 and 2004, data on university graduates for the United States
come from the Digest of Education Statistics (National Center for Education Statistics, 2007); university
graduates are those receiving a bachelor’s degree. Data on the population of 22 year-olds used to
normalize these graduation figures are taken from the Berkeley Mortality Database. For 2000 and 2004,
the graduation rate for other countries is reported by UNESCO; university graduation is the gross
completion rate at ISCED (1997 version) level 5a, first degree.
Notes: Countries listed are those OECD countries that satisfy the income criterion for the analysis (real
GDP per capita ⬎ $20,000 in 2002). Countries in bold were not included in the IALS analysis. From 1970
to 1995 (and for the U.S. in 2000 and 2004), graduation rates are calculated as the number of university
graduates divided by the population aged 22. In some cases, reported years refer to the year before or
the year after (e.g. for Australia, the figures reported for 1980 and 2004 refer to 1981 and 2003). The
others are France (1980 ⫽ 1981, 1990 ⫽ 1991), Netherlands (1995 ⫽ 1994), Denmark (2000 ⫽ 2001),
Iceland (1995 ⫽ 1996) and Japan (1990 ⫽ 1989, 2000 ⫽ 2001).
m
Data missing.

had higher rates of university graduation than the United States. If even a portion of
the observed relationship between university education and the age profile of literacy
were causal, these recent trends in university graduation rates could have dramatic
effects on future literacy patterns across countries. We next delve deeper into the
question of interpretation, examining the sources of variation across countries and
over time in university graduation rates.
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Determinants of the Demand for University Education
University graduation rates are equilibrium outcomes in the higher education
market. We therefore discuss possible explanations for why graduation rates vary
across countries by first considering those on the demand side and then in the next
section considering those on the supply side. To make this discussion tractable, we
limit our attention to the United States and high-income countries in Europe. For
completeness, the tables report data on all countries meeting the income criterion.
How secondary schools are organized has a first-order effect on demand for a
university degree by determining whether all individuals in a country can in principle
receive a university education or whether access to universities will be restricted to a
privileged few. Among students eligible to enroll in universities, the enrollment decision then depends on the expected costs and benefits of a university degree. The costs
include both direct costs, like tuition, and indirect costs, like the opportunity cost of
foregone earnings; the benefits are both pecuniary and nonpecuniary. Cultural dimensions of postwar society, such as the expansion of human rights and the related
“education for all” ethos, may also affect university enrollment decisions independently
of these economic considerations (Schofer and Meyer, 2005).
Which of these demand-side factors have contributed to the variation in
university graduation rates documented in Table 2? Consider first the practice of
school tracking, whereby students are assigned to different types of education
depending on perceived academic ability. Students assigned to the lower tracks of
these systems typically follow a curriculum that is oriented to the labor market and
which might not include the courses required for university enrollment. Even if
these students could take the requisite courses and become eligible for university
after finishing their secondary schooling in a vocational track, this process may
appear too difficult, time-consuming, and costly to accomplish.
As seen in Table 3, countries characterized by low university graduation rates,
such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, select students into tracks at
relatively young ages (12, 10, 14, and 12 respectively) and tend to have relatively
small fractions of students graduating from the final stage of secondary school with
degrees that grant them access to higher education. Country-specific studies of
tracking reforms have generally concluded that tracking is associated with lower
university graduation rates. For example, Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage (2003) show
that the expansion of comprehensive schooling in Norway increased the probability
that affected students attended university. Exploiting variation in the timing of its
implementation across municipalities, Meghir and Palme (2005) show that a Swedish reform allowing students to choose their curricular tracks, rather than assigning
them to tracks based on grades, increased average years of education, especially
among students with less-educated parents. However, studying a Romanian reform
that postponed tracking for two years, Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2007) find that
the postponement of tracking increased the proportion of students who were
eligible to attend university, but did not increase the proportion of students who
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Table 3
Prevalence of Selective versus Comprehensive Secondary Schooling, by Country

United States
Other English-speaking
Australia
Ireland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Continental European
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Switzerland
Scandinavian
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Other OECD
Iceland
Japan

Age when first
selected, 2003

Share of population
graduating from final stage
of secondary education
(upper secondary), 2005

Share of population aged
18–19 with secondary
degrees that allow access to
higher education, 1987

16

76

74.6

16
15
16

70
89
72
86

51.9
76.6a
33.5
36.6

10
12
15
10
14
12
16
15

16
60

25.9
51.0
34.0
28.4
35.7
52.7
35.3

16
16
16
16

59
95b
61
77

71.3
43.6
65.1a
75.7

16
15

55
69

87.8

m

m

38
74
58
44
26

m

m

Sources: OECD Education in OECD Countries (1990, 1993), OECD Education at a Glance (2005, 2007).
Notes: Countries listed are those OECD countries that satisfy the income criterion for the above analysis
(real GDP per capita ⬎ $20,000 in 2002). Countries in bold were not included in the IALS analysis.
a
Data from 1988.
b
Data from 2004.
m
Data missing.

completed university, in part because the supply of university slots— directly controlled by the government— did not change.
These studies have several limitations. In Norway and Sweden, the reduction in
tracking was accompanied by an increase in compulsory schooling, making it
difficult to attribute the gain in educational attainment to the adoption of comprehensive schooling. Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2007), on the other hand, do
not examine the longer-run effects of tracking on university graduation rates,
focusing instead on two adjacent cohorts— one exposed to the old system and the
other to the new regime. We nevertheless surmise that eliminating tracking creates
pressure from the rising number of university-eligible students—pressure that
grows stronger with every additional cohort that passes through the untracked
system. After some time, such pressure may persuade governments to expand the

Education and the Age Profile of Literacy into Adulthood

63

number of university slots, an issue to which we speak in more detail below. This
“delayed” demand story is consistent with the recent increases in university graduation seen in the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, all of which had
abolished tracking by the mid 1970s.
We find less empirical support for other demand-side explanations for the
trends in university graduation shown in Table 2. For example, consider the
variation across countries and over time in returns to education and local labor
market conditions. Historically, returns to education in the United States were not
significantly larger than returns to education in European countries (Psacharopoulos, 1973; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). Returns to education for more
recent years have also been estimated to be broadly similar across European
countries and do not appear to have increased sharply alongside rising university
graduation rates (Harmon, Walker, and Westergaard-Nielson, 2001). Over the
1970s and 1980s, youth labor markets were also relatively strong in the United
States, suggesting that earnings foregone due to school enrollment were relatively
high in the United States during the period of U.S. dominance in higher education.7 Although the recessions in parts of Europe in the early 1990s may explain
some of the growth in European university graduation rates, few studies have
established a strong effect of youth unemployment on university graduation rates
(for example, Card and Lemieux, 2001).
Reasonable assumptions also suggest that family background contributed little
both to the U.S. advantage in university graduation in the 1970s and 1980s and to
the increase in university graduation in Europe in recent years. Using data from a
sample of adoptees in the United States, Plug (2004) finds that having a universityeducated (adoptive) mother increases the probability of being university educated
by around five percentage points (off a base of 25 percent). Given this estimate and
the 15 percentage point university graduation rate advantage among U.S. parents
in the 1970s and 1980s, family background can explain only three percentage
points of the cross-country difference in graduation rates among young adults
over these decades. Similarly, university graduation rates of parents rose around
three percentage points in Europe in recent years, suggesting that less than one
percentage point of the recent European increases in university completion can
be explained by increases in parental education. If anything, this is likely to be
an upper bound, as the intergenerational transmission of education may be
weaker in Europe than in the United States (for example, Black, Devereux, and
Salvanes, 2005).

7

For example, using OECD data on the numbers of unemployed who claimed benefits among the
group aged 15–24 in the United States, we calculate that on average, over the period 1980 –1989, this
represented 8.2 percent of the relevant population. Across the European countries for which comparable data are available (Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden),
the corresponding figure was 10.5 percent. Population data are taken from the Berkeley Mortality
Database at 具http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/⬃bmd/典.
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Tuition, fees, and other out-of-pocket costs of university enrollment also
cannot account for these patterns because they traditionally have been highest in
the United States. As shown in Table 4, a larger share of U.S. students attends
(costlier) private institutions of higher education, and those that attend public
institutions pay more in tuition. Although some of the costs of higher education are
offset by scholarships and grants, data from the mid 1990s confirm that per student
enrolled, education-related public subsidies to households are far higher in European countries (OCED, Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators, 1997, table B3.1b).
Higher out-of-pocket costs of college have been found to deter college completion
in the United States (Dynarski, 2003, forthcoming), suggesting that with lower
tuition and fees, the historical U.S. graduation advantage would have been greater
still. As we discuss below, the apparent paradox of a positive correlation between fees
and graduation rates across countries may be explained by the fact that low prices in
other countries have often been accompanied by shortages of university slots.
The historical U.S. advantage in university graduation may, however, be related to another fundamental determinant of the cost of university education—the
typical number of years required to obtain a first degree. A degree that takes longer
to achieve is less attractive if higher education displays “sheepskin effects”—that is,
if the returns to a degree that students quit halfway through are less than half of the
full return to the completed degree—and if students perceive longer degrees as
riskier investments. In several European countries, the first university degree takes
more than five years to obtain, as shown in Table 1, whereas in the United States
it requires four years of full-time enrollment. This demand-side factor cannot,
however, explain recent increases in European graduation rates, as the time
required to obtain a degree has remained relatively constant in Europe.

Determinants of the Supply of University Education
The supply of university education is characterized by a level of government
involvement that is generally high, while varying widely across countries. Governments subsidize the education that is supplied, at times regulate the education that
can be supplied (such as the fields that can be offered), and often supply some of
this education directly via universities that are government owned and government
controlled. In many cases, governments directly determine the number of students
who may enroll. Governments also set prices for many universities and determine
standards for financial aid.
Among rich countries, the United States has the least government involvement
in the provision of higher education (as suggested in Table 4 by the relatively high
fraction of U.S. graduates from private universities and the relatively high tuition
paid by students to attend U.S. public colleges and universities). Well over half of
U.S. college and university revenues are derived from private sources—payments of
tuition and other fees. By contrast, in nearly all high-income European countries,
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Table 4
Costs of Enrolling in Public Higher Education, by Country (2003–2004)

United States
Other English-speaking
Australia
Ireland
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Continental European
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Switzerland
Scandinavian
Denmark
Finland
Norway
Sweden
Other OECD
Iceland
Japana

% of full-time students enrolled
in public higher education

Average annual
tuition fees ($)

69.2

4587

77

99.9

3781

27.2

m

m

98.1
100

2538
1794

90
48.8
90

853
540
156 to 462

% of students receiving
scholarships/grants

m

31
m

m

22.5
24.6

m

m

m

94
100
87.4
95

983
1565
668 to 935
566 to 1132

18.9
85
31
12.8

99.7
87
88
93.3

none
none
none
none

NA
NA
NA
NA

87
24.9

none
3747

0

Source: OECD Education at a Glance (2006).
Notes: Countries listed are those OECD countries that satisfy the income criterion for the above analysis
(real GDP per capita ⬎ $20,000 in 2002). Countries in bold were not included in the IALS analysis. “NA”
means “not applicable.”
a
Annual average tuition in private higher education in Japan: $4,767–$25,468; a negligible number of
students receive scholarships/grants to cover these costs. We include this information because a high
fraction of Japanese university graduates are from private universities.
b
Data from 2004.
m
Data missing.

higher education is funded primarily by the government, either directly (through
government purchases of educational resources or grants to institutions) or indirectly (through the provision of grants or loans to students to offset tuition and
living costs). These cross-country patterns are quite stable over time.
The natural first question to ask is how have varying degrees of government
involvement in the provision of higher education historically affected university
supply. Card and Lemieux (2001) and Bound and Turner (2007) provide a useful
framework for answering this question and estimating the elasticity of university
supply within the United States. They look at the impact of demographic-driven
demand shocks—that is, sharp changes in the size of the college-age cohort— on
university graduation rates. If supply changed to accommodate these shocks, the
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graduation rate would remain constant, and hence would be unrelated to demand
shifts measured by cohort size. If, however, the supply of university slots were fixed,
the number of graduates would remain unchanged across cohorts, but the graduation
rate would fall as cohort size increased and rise as cohort size fell. Using variation
in cohort size across states and over time, both studies find that a 10 percent
increase in cohort size in the United States reduces the university graduation rate
by about 0.5 percentage points. This finding implies that the university sector
expands to accommodate some, but not all, of the shock to demand for higher
education.8
We next provide a parallel estimate for European countries, so we can compare the responsiveness of supply in Europe to that of the United States. We
estimate the impact of cohort size on graduation rates over the years 1970 –2005
using data from the 14 European countries listed in Tables 2– 4 (Ireland, the
United Kingdom, and the Continental European and the Scandinavian countries).
We estimated an ordinary least squares regression with university graduation
rates by country and by year as the dependent variable. The key explanatory
variable was the natural log of the population 22 years of age in that country during
that year. We also included a constant term and a full set of country- and yearspecific intercept terms. The country intercept accounts for the fact that some
countries have persistently higher rates of college completion, while the yearspecific intercept captures trends in university graduation rates that would have
been shared by all of these countries in the absence of changes in cohort size.9 Our

8
To illustrate, suppose cohort size is steady at 200,000 and the graduation rate is around 20 percent
(40,000 graduates per cohort). Now suppose cohort size rises 10 percent, to 220,000. The estimate above
implies that the graduation rate for the new cohort will be 19.5 percent rather than 20 percent. Said
differently, only 42,900 individuals in the larger cohort will graduate, instead of the 44,000 that would
have been expected to graduate with maintenance of a constant graduation rate, or with full accommodation of the demand shock.
9
We estimate the following regression model:

GraduationRate ct ⫽ ␣ ⫹ ␤ ln共pop22ct 兲 ⫹ c ⫹ ␥t ⫹ ct .
In 1970, 1975, and 1980 –1998, the dependent variable, Graduation Ratect is calculated as the number of
graduates in country c in year t (from UNESCO at 具http://www.uis.unesco.org/pagesen/DBGTerIsced.asp典)
divided by the size of the population aged 22 in year t in country c (estimated as described below). From
1999 –2005, Graduation Ratect is reported by UNESCO (at 具http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/
document.aspx?ReportId⫽136&IF_Language⫽eng&BR_Topic⫽0典). The coefficient of interest is that on
the natural log of the number of births 22 years prior to year t in country c, ln(pop22ct), taken from the
Berkeley Mortality Database (at 具http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/⬃bmd/典). Because this is only an
approximation of the number of 22 year-olds in country c in year t, and because not all university
graduates are 22 years old, the estimated effect of cohort size is likely a lower bound on its true effect.
The parameters c and ␥t represent country- and year-specific intercepts, respectively. To account for
differences in the definition of the graduation rate before and after 1998, we also interact the country
fixed effects with an indicator set to one for years 1999 and later. In the estimates reported, we use data
on the countries listed in the text in all available years (1970, 1975, 1980 –2005); the total number of
observations is 266.
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estimate of the coefficient on the population term is around – 0.098 (with a
standard error of 0.044). This estimate implies that a 10 percent increase in cohort
size is associated with about a one percentage point decrease in university graduation rates—roughly double the magnitude of the effect found for the United
States by Card and Lemieux (2001) and Bound and Turner (2007). This finding
suggests that the supply of university slots may be more flexible in the United States
than in Europe.
Why might the supply of university slots be more flexible in the United States?
Limited and decentralized public sector involvement in higher education could
generate more flexible supply-side responses, because institutions that generate
larger shares of their revenue from tuition and other private sources can adjust
revenues more quickly than institutions relying more heavily on government
funding. (Recall the Malamud and Pop-Eleches (2007) finding on Romania.)
Indeed, looking across university types within the United States, Bound and
Turner (2007) estimate that changes in cohort size have almost no impact on
enrollment rates into private colleges and universities in the United States. In
other words, private-sector supply adjusts immediately to accommodate demand
changes. Bound and Turner also find that public community colleges are quite
sensitive in their supply responses. While these colleges do rely on government
funding, access is the central part of their mission, and they expand supply to
serve more students even if it is with significantly fewer resources per student.
Only the presence of public universities generates a negative relationship
between cohort size and university enrollment rates in the United States.
Because the European university market is dominated by public universities,
this story is consistent with our results.
In addition, the competition generated by a large private sector and a decentralized public sector could lead universities to supply education to lower-ability
students or to provide the types of education (for example, short-duration courses
in more applied fields) that lower-ability students might prefer, thereby removing
an implicit cap on the number of university slots available. More flexible government regulations in the United States, such as those allowing students to transfer to
four-year universities after completing courses in two-year colleges (Kane and
Rouse, 1999), or allowing universities to determine permissible courses of study
without government approval, likely matter as well.
The relative flexibility of the U.S. supply side, which may be due in part to the
decentralized and deregulated U.S. higher education sector, thus appears to contribute to the historical U.S. graduation rate advantage. This argument does not
imply that a centralized and largely public higher education sector cannot expand
access. Just as some European countries had moved from selective to comprehensive secondary education by the 1970s, many have recently shifted from “elite”
higher education to “mass” higher education, which Trow (1974) characterized as
serving at least 15 percent of the “age grade” by increasing access to both elite
university programs and “popular nonelite institutions.” This transition appears to
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have occurred because European governments have increased supply—not continuously and flexibly, but through discrete policy responses to long-standing shortages (for example, Moscati and Rostan, 2000; Greenaway and Haynes, 2000).
Combined with declines in the size of the college-aged population brought about
by the drop in fertility in Europe in prior decades (see Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern
in this symposium), such policy shifts have almost certainly been at the heart of the
dramatic increases in university graduation rates shown in Table 2.

Conclusions
Literacy gains into adulthood vary across countries, and these gains are
strongly correlated with participation in higher education. A country’s university
graduation rate is tied to how secondary education is organized and how higher
education is funded. We do not want to claim that all of the correlation between
university graduation and the age profile of literacy into adulthood reflects the
causal effects of university graduation. After all, educational systems reflect the
preferences of a country’s citizens and therefore may be correlated with other
institutions, such as labor market regulation, that shape the incentives to acquire
skills after compulsory schooling has ended.
Bearing this limitation in mind, we reach some tentative conclusions. First, the
historical advantage that the United States has enjoyed in college graduation
appears to be an important reason why, between the teen years and the late
twenties, American literacy rates appear to catch up with those in other highincome countries. The share of native-born Americans in the IALS that were able
to make high-level inferences was nearly five times higher among those in their late
twenties (23 percent) than among those in their teens (4.7 percent). Taken at face
value, our estimates suggest that much of this difference was driven by the relatively
high rate of university graduation in the United States. If the university graduation
rate in the United States had been 15 percent instead of 30 percent—roughly the
average among the European countries in our data at this time—the literacy
difference for Americans in these age groups would have been roughly half as large,
and the United States would have continued to rank near the bottom of the
test-score distribution among individuals in their late twenties. Second, and by the
same token, the recent convergence of other high-income countries’ university
graduation rates to that of the United States could push the test scores for U.S.
young adults down the international distribution.
Just as the adoption of mass secondary education in Europe in the postwar
period shined a light on the low output of U.S. elementary and secondary schools
(Goldin, 2003), this convergence might increase the performance pressure on U.S.
colleges and universities. Examples of such pressure include attempts by individual
institutions and states to test students and hold colleges and universities “accountable,” as documented and encouraged by a commission headed by Secretary of
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Education Margaret Spellings (U.S. Department of Education, 2006). Some other
countries have also moved in this direction, as Rezende (2007) documents in the
case of Brazil. If more do, and if data on testing outcomes were collected and
disseminated, it would permit more systematic and more reliable estimation of the
value added by higher education.
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James Hines, John Meyer, Bruce Sacerdote, Andrei Shleifer, Jeremy Stein, and Timothy Taylor
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data used in this paper.
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